Emerg Infect Dis by Robbins, Amy et al.
LETTERS
NDM-positive Salmonella sp. strain iden-
tified in the United States. Antimicrob 
Agents Chemother. 2011;55:5957–8. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1128/AAC.05719-11
  5. Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion. Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacte-
riaceae containing New Delhi metallo-β-
lactamase in two patientsRhode Island, 
March 2012. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly 
Rep. 2012;61:446–8.
  6. Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention. Notes from the field: hospital 
outbreak of carbapenem-resistant Kleb-
siella pneumoniae producing New Delhi 
metallo-β-lactamase—Denver, Colorado, 
2012. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 
2013;62:108.
  7. Mathers AJ, Hazen KC, Carroll J, 
Yeh AJ, Cox HL, Bonomo RA, et al. 
First clinical cases of OXA-48-producing 
carbapenem-resistant Klebsiella pneu-
moniae in the United States: the “menace” 
arrives in the new world. J Clin Microbiol. 
2013;51:680–3. http://dx.doi.org/10.1128/
JCM.02580-12
  8. Berçot B, Poirel L, Nordmann P. Updated 
multiplex polymerase chain reaction for 
detection of 16S rRNA methylases: high 
prevalence among NDM-1 producers. 
Diagn Microbiol Infect Dis. 2011;71:442–5. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.diagmicrobio. 
2011.08.016
  9. Potron A, Rondinaud E, Poirel L, 
Belmonte O, Boyer S, Camiade S, 
et al. Genetic and biochemical charac-
terisation of OXA-232, a carbapenem-
hydrolysing class D β-lactamase from 
Enterobacteriaceae. Int J Antimicrob 
Agents. 2013;41:325–9. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/j.ijantimicag.2012.11.007
10. Giske CG, Froding I, Hasan CM, 
Turlej-Rogacka A, Toleman M, 
Livermore D, et al. Diverse sequence 
types of Klebsiella pneumoniae contribute 
to the dissemination of blaNDM-1 in India, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Antimi-
crob Agents Chemother. 2012;56:2735–8. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1128/AAC.06142-11
Address for correspondence: Yohei Doi, 
Division of Infectious Diseases, University 
of Pittsburgh School of Medicine, Scaife Hall 
S829, 3550 Terrace St, Pittsburgh, PA 15261, 
USA; email: yod4@pitt.edu






To the Editor: Shiga toxin–pro-
ducing Escherichia coli (STEC) cause 
severe illness in humans, especially 
young and elderly persons. In previ-
ous decades, prevention and control 
measures focused on STEC O157:H7; 
however, in recent years, non-O157 
STEC–related outbreaks and illnesses 
have been detected more frequently. In 
the United States, 6 serogroups (O26, 
O45, O103, O111, O121, and O145) 
account for ≈75% of the reported non-
O157 STEC illnesses (1).
On August 4, 2010, the Maine 
Center for Disease Control and Pre-
vention (Maine CDC) investigated 2 
isolates of nonmotile STEC O26 that 
were indistinguishable by pulsed-field 
gel electrophoresis (PFGE). Both 
case-patients had diarrhea and ab-
dominal cramps, shopped at grocery 
stores in the same town, and reported 
consumption of ground beef. Case-pa-
tient 1 purchased ground beef at Store 
A; a shopper card used for the pur-
chase was shared with investigators. 
Case-patient 2 consumed ground beef 
purchased from 2 stores (Stores B and 
C); neither shopper cards nor receipts 
were available.
On August 5, a Maine Depart-
ment of Agriculture, Food and Rural 
Resources (Maine DoA) inspector 
visited Stores A and B. On June 25, 
case-patient 1 had purchased 90% 
lean ground beef at Store A; the beef 
was produced by a parent company 
with multiple establishments. Inspec-
tors cross-referenced this purchase 
with meat grinding logs from Store 
B, which revealed that the parent 
company that supplied ground beef to 
Store A also supplied beef to Store B. 
Maine DoA notified the United States 
Department of Agriculture, Food 
Safety and Inspection Service (USDA-
FSIS), of a common manufacturer.
On August 9, the New York State 
(NYS) Department of Health contact-
ed Maine CDC regarding a third case-
patient with an STEC O26 isolate that 
was indistinguishable by PFGE from 
the other 2 isolates. Case-patient 3 
had handled 90% lean ground beef 
purchased from the grocery store 
chain used by case-patient 1 (Store A). 
Shopper card information indicated 
that the beef was purchased on June 
17. Ground beef was the only common 
exposure among the 3 case-patients.
During August 18–26, Maine 
DoA, NYS Department of Agricul-
ture and Markets, and USDA-FSIS 
conducted a traceback of ground beef 
(Figure). Traceback revealed that for 
>10 years, Store A had been purchas-
ing 90% lean ground beef from Estab-
lishment X (1 of many establishments 
within the parent company). Further 
investigation revealed that implicated 
ground beef from Store A locations 
in Maine and New York had come 
from the same lot at Establishment X. 
USDA-FSIS conducted ground beef 
traceback at Stores B and C; source 
materials were received from multiple 
establishments, but Establishment X 
was the only common supplier (Fig-
ure). On August 28, Establishment X 
recalled ≈8,500 pounds of ground beef 
that had been produced on June 11.
On September 2, the NYS De-
partment of Health Public Health 
Laboratory tested leftover hamburger 
patties purchased by case-patient 3. 
The samples were confirmed as STEC 
O26 with a PFGE pattern indistin-
guishable from the strains isolated 
from case-patients.
On November 17, USDA-FSIS 
completed an assessment at Establish-
ment X and determined that the com-
pany’s food safety system was ade-
quate to control pathogens of concern. 
Follow-up testing of beef trim samples 
at Establishment X were negative for 
STEC O26 and O157:H7.
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The Council to Improve Food-
borne Outbreak Response guidelines 
emphasize the importance of timely 
involvement of all members in out-
break investigations (2). A review 
of enteric disease investigations by 
Hedberg et al. (3) concluded a need to 
increase timeliness of case investiga-
tion and to reduce delays during out-
break investigations. While waiting 
for PFGE confirmation, Maine CDC 
notified Maine DoA of case-patients 
who purchased ground beef in the 
same city. Within 48 hours, an inspec-
tor visited grocery stores where case-
patients purchased ground beef and 
notified USDA-FSIS of the illness in-
vestigation. Ten days after the shopper 
card information from case-patient 3 
was available, USDA-FSIS convened 
a recall committee. Quick action by 
all agencies led to timely investiga-
tion, traceback, and recall. This well-
characterized outbreak of only 3 cases 
of STEC O26 infection led to a recall 
of ground beef.
Foodborne illness investigations 
increasingly rely on purchase records 
from shopper cards, which record 
information such as purchase dates, 
brands, and product types that are valu-
able for traceback and identification 
of common exposure to a food item. 
After a thorough record review, inves-
tigators in this outbreak were able to 
narrow the purchased beef to 1 pro-
duction date. This finding emphasizes 
the importance of recordkeeping at 
retail stores and meat processing es-
tablishments to determine production 
dates in the event of a recall. Shopper 
cards are used more frequently during 
investigations, so safeguards to protect 
the consumers’ personally identifiable 
information are needed to prevent in-
appropriate disclosure and accidental 
breeches of confidentiality.
In an effort to reduce human ill-
nesses, USDA-FSIS developed policy 
on non-O157 STEC in raw beef prod-
ucts to declare 6 serogroups of patho-
genic STEC as adulterants in nonin-
tact raw beef (4). The Agency began 
implementing routine testing for these 
serogroups in June 2012. 
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To the Editor: Salmonella spp. 
cause ≈1.2 million human illnesses an-
nually in the United States (1). Infec-
tions are primarily acquired through 
exposure to contaminated food or 
infected animals (1,2). Since 2007, 
state and local health departments and 
the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention have investigated mul-
tiple salmonellosis outbreaks linked 
to meat purchased at live-bird mar-
kets (LBMs) and live-animal markets 
(LAMs), where poultry and livestock 
are sold for onsite slaughter. These 
markets typically operate in large cit-
ies and serve populations of diverse 
ethnic backgrounds (3).
In 2007, an outbreak involving 
62 case-patients infected with 1 of 
3 S. enterica serotype Schwarzen-
grund strains was investigated in 
Massachusetts; 61% were children 
<5 years of age, including 14 (23%) 
infants <1 year of age, and 96% were 
Asian (Table). A case-patient was 
defined as a person infected with S. 
enterica who had a pulsed-field gel 
electrophoresis XbaI restriction en-
zyme pattern indistinguishable from 
the outbreak strain. Exposure to 
poultry purchased at LBMs was re-
ported, and environmental sampling 
at an implicated LBM identified 6 S. 
enterica serotypes, including 1 out-
break strain.
Three subsequent investigations 
of S. enterica serotype Schwarzen-
grund infections were conducted: 
a 2009 outbreak of 50 cases in New 
York, New York; a 2010–2011 multi-
state outbreak of cases predominantly 
in New York, New Jersey, and Mas-
sachusetts; and a 2012 multistate out-
break of cases mostly in Illinois and 
Michigan. Most case-patients in these 
outbreaks were of Asian race or His-
panic ethnicity, but 3/5 case-patients 
in Michigan reported Arab ethnicity; 
>50% were infants or children <5 
years of age.
Among case-patients with avail-
able information, exposure to poultry 
from LBMs was reported by 88% of 
case-patients in the 2009 New York 
investigation, 35% in the 2010–2011 
multistate investigation, and 50% in 
the 2012 multistate investigation. In 
Michigan, the outbreak strain was 
isolated from chicken purchased at an 
LBM and collected from households 
of 2 case-patients.
During 2011–2012, the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention 
investigated a nationwide increase in 
S. enterica serotype I,4,[5],12:i- in-
fections (pulsed-field gel electropho-
resis XbaI restriction enzyme pattern 
JPXX01.1314). Although no single 
vehicle was implicated, clusters 
linked to LAMs were identified. In 
Minnesota, 14 illnesses were linked 
to meat from 3 neighboring LAMs. 
Environmental sampling identified 
the outbreak strain from an animal-
holding pen at 1 of the markets. 
Seven case-patients were infants <1 
year of age, and 10 reported Hmong 
ethnicity. In California, 10 illnesses 
likely associated with pork, lamb, 
and beef purchased at 3 LAMs were 
identified; case-patients reported 
Ethiopian and Hmong ethnicity. The 
outbreak strain was isolated from a 
pork leg collected from the freezer 
of a case-patient.
LBMs and LAMs appear to be 
preferred by certain populations for 
cultural, culinary, or religious reasons. 
Exposure to meat from these markets 
is being increasingly recognized as a 























62 38/62	(61) 14/62	(23) 53/54	(98) NA 8/10	(80) 
2009 New	York,	NY JM6X01.0240 50 37/50	(74) 15/50	(30) 7/20	(35) 9/17	(53) 14/16	(88) 
2010–2011 Multistate¶ JM6X01.0240 233 105/209	(50) 19/209	(9) 26/72	(36) 29/72	(40) 28/80	(35) 
2012 Multistate# JM6X01.0323 15 8/15	(53) 3/15	(20) 1/12	(8) 5/12	(42) 6/12	(50) 
*NA,	not	available. 
†Defined by pulsed-field	gel	electrophoresis	XbaI	restriction	enzyme	pattern. 
‡Denominators are dependent on number of case-patients	interviewed	and	may	vary	from	case	counts. 
§Includes infants	<1	y	of	age. 
¶Case	distribution	includes	New	York	(91,	39%),	New	Jersey	(52,	22%),	and	Massachusetts	(44,	19%). 
#Case	distribution	includes	Illinois	(8,	53%)	and	Michigan	(5,	33%). 
 
